Surveillance as search engine
The National Security Agency is secretly providing data to nearly two
dozen U.S. government agencies with a “Google-like” search engine built
to share more than 850 billion records about phone calls, emails,
cellphone locations, and internet chats, according to classified
documents obtained by
The Intercept.
The documents provide the first definitive evidence that the NSA has
for years made massive amounts of surveillance data directly accessible
to domestic law enforcement agencies. Planning documents for ICREACH, as
the search engine is called, cite the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the Drug Enforcement Administration as key participants.
ICREACH contains information on the private communications of
foreigners and, it appears, millions of records on American citizens who
have not been accused of any wrongdoing. Details about its existence
are contained in the archive of materials provided to
The Intercept by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden.
Earlier revelations sourced to the Snowden documents have exposed a
multitude of NSA programs for collecting large volumes of
communications. The NSA has acknowledged that it shares some of its
collected data with domestic agencies like the FBI, but details about
the method and scope of its sharing have remained shrouded in secrecy.
ICREACH has been accessible to more than 1,000 analysts at 23 U.S.
government agencies that perform intelligence work, according to a 2010 memo. A planning document
from 2007 lists the DEA, FBI, Central Intelligence Agency, and the
Defense Intelligence Agency as core members. Information shared through
ICREACH can be used to track people’s movements, map out their networks
of associates, help predict future actions, and potentially reveal
religious affiliations or political beliefs.
The creation of ICREACH represented a landmark moment in the history
of classified U.S. government surveillance, according to the NSA
documents.
“The ICREACH team delivered the first-ever wholesale sharing of
communications metadata within the U.S. Intelligence Community,” noted a top-secret memo
dated December 2007. “This team began over two years ago with a basic
concept compelled by the IC’s increasing need for communications
metadata and NSA’s ability to collect, process and store vast amounts of
communications metadata related to worldwide intelligence targets.”
The search tool was designed to be the largest system for internally
sharing secret surveillance records in the United States, capable of
handling two to five billion new records every day, including more than
30 different kinds of metadata on emails, phone calls, faxes, internet
chats, and text messages, as well as location information collected from
cellphones. Metadata reveals information about a communication—such as
the “to” and “from” parts of an email, and the time and date it was
sent, or the phone numbers someone called and when they called—but not
the content of the message or audio of the call.
ICREACH does not appear to have a direct relationship to the large NSA database, previously
reported by The Guardian,
that stores information on millions of ordinary Americans’ phone calls
under Section 215 of the Patriot Act. Unlike the 215 database, which is
accessible to a small number of NSA employees and can be searched only
in terrorism-related investigations, ICREACH grants access to a vast
pool of data that can be mined by analysts from across the intelligence
community for “foreign intelligence”—a vague term that is far broader
than counterterrorism.
Data available through ICREACH appears to be primarily derived from
surveillance of foreigners’ communications, and planning documents show
that it draws on a variety of different sources of data maintained by
the NSA. Though
one 2010 internal paper clearly calls it “the ICREACH database,” a U.S. official familiar with the system disputed that, telling
The Intercept
that while “it enables the sharing of certain foreign intelligence
metadata,” ICREACH is “not a repository [and] does not store events or
records.” Instead, it appears to provide analysts with the ability to
perform a one-stop search of information from a wide variety of separate
databases.
In a statement to
The Intercept, the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence confirmed that the system shares data that is
swept up by programs authorized under Executive Order 12333, a
controversial
Reagan-era presidential directive that underpins several NSA bulk
surveillance operations that monitor communications overseas. The 12333
surveillance takes place with no court oversight and has received
minimal Congressional scrutiny because it is targeted at foreign, not
domestic, communication networks. But the broad scale of 12333
surveillance means that some Americans’ communications get caught in the
dragnet as they transit international cables or satellites—and
documents contained in the Snowden archive indicate that ICREACH taps
into some of that data.
Legal experts told
The Intercept they were shocked to learn
about the scale of the ICREACH system and are concerned that law
enforcement authorities might use it for domestic investigations that
are not related to terrorism.
“To me, this is extremely troublesome,” said Elizabeth Goitein,
co-director of the Liberty and National Security Program at the New York
University School of Law’s
Brennan Center for Justice.
“The myth that metadata is just a bunch of numbers and is not as
revealing as actual communications content was exploded long ago—this is
a trove of incredibly sensitive information.”
Brian Owsley, a federal magistrate judge between 2005 and 2013, said
he was alarmed that traditional law enforcement agencies such as the FBI
and the DEA were among those with access to the NSA’s surveillance
troves.
“This is not something that I think the government should be doing,”
said Owsley, an assistant professor of law at Indiana Tech Law School.
“Perhaps if information is useful in a specific case, they can get
judicial authority to provide it to another agency. But there shouldn’t
be this buddy-buddy system back-and-forth.”
Jeffrey Anchukaitis, an
ODNI spokesman, declined to comment on a series of questions from
The Intercept
about the size and scope of ICREACH, but said that sharing information
had become “a pillar of the post-9/11 intelligence community” as part of
an effort to prevent valuable intelligence from being “stove-piped in
any single office or agency.”
Using ICREACH to query the surveillance data, “analysts can develop
vital intelligence leads without requiring access to raw intelligence
collected by other IC [Intelligence Community] agencies,” Anchukaitis
said. “In the case of NSA, access to raw signals intelligence is
strictly limited to those with the training and authority to handle it
appropriately. The highest priority of the intelligence community is to
work within the constraints of law to collect, analyze and understand
information related to potential threats to our national security.”
One-Stop Shopping
The mastermind behind ICREACH was recently retired NSA director Gen. Keith Alexander, who outlined his vision for the system in
a classified 2006 letter
to the then-Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte. The
search tool, Alexander wrote, would “allow unprecedented volumes of
communications metadata to be shared and analyzed,” opening up a “vast,
rich source of information” for other agencies to exploit. By late 2007
the NSA reported to its employees that the system had gone live as a
pilot program.
The NSA described ICREACH as a “one-stop shopping tool” for analyzing
communications. The system would enable at least a 12-fold increase in
the volume of metadata being shared between intelligence community
agencies, the documents
stated.
Using ICREACH, the NSA planned to boost the amount of communications
“events” it shared with other U.S. government agencies from 50 billion
to more than 850 billion, bolstering an older top-secret data sharing
system named CRISSCROSS/PROTON, which was launched in the 1990s and
managed by the CIA.
To allow government agents to sift through the masses of records on
ICREACH, engineers designed a simple “Google-like” search interface.
This enabled analysts to run searches against particular “selectors”
associated with a person of interest—such as an email address or phone
number—and receive a page of results displaying, for instance, a list of
phone calls made and received by a suspect over a month-long period.
The documents suggest these results can be used reveal the “social
network” of the person of interest—in other words, those that they
communicate with, such as friends, family, and other associates.
The purpose of ICREACH, projected initially to cost between $2.5
million and $4.5 million per year, was to allow government agents to
comb through the NSA’s metadata troves to identify new leads for
investigations, to predict potential future threats against the U.S.,
and to keep tabs on what the NSA calls “worldwide intelligence targets.”
However, the documents make clear that it is not only data about
foreigners’ communications that are available on the system. Alexander’s
memo states that “many millions of…minimized communications metadata
records” would be available through ICREACH, a reference to the process
of “minimization,” whereby identifying information—such as part of a
phone number or email address—is removed so it is not visible to the
analyst. NSA documents define minimization as “specific procedures to
minimize the acquisition and retention [of] information concerning
unconsenting U.S. persons”—making it a near certainty that ICREACH gives
analysts access to millions of records about Americans. The “minimized”
information can still be retained under NSA rules for up to five years
and “unmasked” at any point during that period if it is ever deemed
necessary for an investigation.
The Brennan Center’s Goitein said it appeared that with ICREACH, the
government “drove a truck” through loopholes that allowed it to
circumvent restrictions on retaining data about Americans. This raises a
variety of legal and constitutional issues, according to Goitein,
particularly if the data can be easily searched on a large scale by
agencies like the FBI and DEA for their domestic investigations.
“The idea with minimization is that the government is basically
supposed to pretend this information doesn’t exist, unless it falls
under certain narrow categories,” Goitein said. “But functionally
speaking, what we’re seeing here is that minimization means, ‘we’ll hold
on to the data as long as we want to, and if we see anything that
interests us then we can use it.’”
A key question, according to several experts consulted by
The Intercept,
is whether the FBI, DEA or other domestic agencies have used their
access to ICREACH to secretly trigger investigations of Americans
through a controversial process known as “parallel construction.”
Parallel construction involves law enforcement agents using
information gleaned from covert surveillance, but later covering up
their use of that data by creating a new evidence trail that excludes
it. This hides the true origin of the investigation from defense lawyers
and, on occasion, prosecutors and judges—which means the legality of
the evidence that triggered the investigation cannot be challenged in
court.
In practice, this could mean that a DEA agent identifies an
individual he believes is involved in drug trafficking in the United
States on the basis of information stored on ICREACH. The agent begins
an investigation but pretends, in his records of the investigation, that
the original tip did not come from the secret trove. Last year, Reuters
first reported
details of parallel construction based on NSA data, linking the
practice to a unit known as the Special Operations Division, which
Reuters said distributes tips from NSA intercepts and a DEA database
known as DICE.
Tampa attorney James Felman, chair of the American Bar Association’s criminal justice section, told
The Intercept
that parallel construction is a “tremendously problematic” tactic
because law enforcement agencies “must be honest with courts about where
they are getting their information.” The ICREACH revelations, he said,
“raise the question of whether parallel construction is present in more
cases than we had thought. And if that’s true, it is deeply disturbing
and disappointing.”
Anchukaitis, the ODNI spokesman, declined to say whether ICREACH has
been used to aid domestic investigations, and he would not name all of
the agencies with access to the data. “Access to information-sharing
tools is restricted to users conducting foreign intelligence analysis
who have the appropriate training to handle the data,” he said.
CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, 2001.
Project CRISSCROSS
The roots of ICREACH can be traced back more than two decades.
In the early 1990s, the CIA and the DEA embarked on a secret
initiative called Project CRISSCROSS. The agencies built a database
system to analyze phone billing records and phone directories, in order
to identify links between intelligence targets and other persons of
interest. At first, CRISSCROSS was used in Latin America and was
“extremely successful” at identifying narcotics-related suspects. It
stored only five kinds of metadata on phone calls: date, time, duration,
called number, and calling number, according to
an NSA memo.
The program rapidly grew in size and scope. By 1999, the NSA, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, and the FBI had gained access to CRISSCROSS
and were contributing information to it. As CRISSCROSS continued to
expand, it was supplemented with a system called PROTON that enabled
analysts to store and examine additional types of data. These included
unique codes used to identify individual cellphones, location data, text
messages, passport and flight records, visa application information, as
well as excerpts culled from CIA intelligence reports.
An NSA memo
noted
that PROTON could identify people based on whether they behaved in a
“similar manner to a specific target.” The memo also said the system
“identifies correspondents in common with two or more targets,
identifies potential new phone numbers when a target switches phones,
and identifies networks of organizations based on communications within
the group.” In July 2006, the NSA estimated that it was storing 149
billion phone records on PROTON.
According to the NSA documents, PROTON was used to track down “High
Value Individuals” in the United States and Iraq, investigate front
companies, and discover information about foreign government operatives.
CRISSCROSS enabled major narcotics arrests and was integral to the
CIA’s rendition program during the Bush Administration, which involved
abducting terror suspects and flying them to secret “black site” prisons
where they were brutally interrogated and sometimes tortured.
One NSA document
on the system, dated from July 2005, noted that the use of
communications metadata “has been a contribution to virtually every
successful rendition of suspects and often, the deciding factor.”
However, the NSA came to view CRISSCROSS/PROTON as insufficient, in
part due to the aging standard of its technology. The intelligence
community was sensitive to criticism that it had failed to share
information that could potentially have helped prevent the 9/11 attacks,
and it had been strongly criticized for intelligence failures before
the invasion of Iraq in 2003. For the NSA, it was time to build a new
and more advanced system to radically increase metadata sharing.
A New Standard
In 2006, NSA director Alexander drafted his
secret proposal to then-Director of National Intelligence Negroponte.
Alexander laid out his vision for what he described as a
“communications metadata coalition” that would be led by the NSA. His
idea was to build a sophisticated new tool that would grant other
federal agencies access to “more than 50 existing NSA/CSS metadata
fields contained in trillions of records” and handle “many millions” of
new minimized records every day—indicating that a large number of
Americans’ communications would be included.
The NSA’s contributions to the ICREACH system, Alexander wrote,
“would dwarf the volume of NSA’s present contributions to PROTON, as
well as the input of all other [intelligence community] contributors.”
Alexander explained in the memo that NSA was already collecting “vast
amounts of communications metadata” and was preparing to share some of
it on a system called GLOBALREACH with its counterparts in the so-called
Five Eyes surveillance alliance: the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada,
and New Zealand.
ICREACH, he proposed, could be designed like GLOBALREACH and
accessible only to U.S. agencies in the intelligence community, or IC.
A top-secret
PowerPoint presentation from May 2007
illustrated how ICREACH would work—revealing its “Google-like” search
interface and showing how the NSA planned to link it to the DEA, DIA,
CIA, and the FBI. Each agency would access and input data through a
secret data “broker”—a sort of digital letterbox—linked to the central
NSA system. ICREACH, according to the presentation, would also receive
metadata from the Five Eyes allies.
The aim was not necessarily for ICREACH to completely replace
CRISSCROSS/PROTON, but rather to complement it. The NSA planned to use
the new system to perform more advanced kinds of surveillance—such as
“pattern of life analysis,” which involves monitoring who individuals
communicate with and the places they visit over a period of several
months, in order to observe their habits and predict future behavior.
The NSA agreed to train other U.S. government agencies to use
ICREACH. Intelligence analysts could be “certified” for access to the
massive database if they required access in support of a given mission,
worked as an analyst within the U.S. intelligence community, and had
top-secret security clearance. (According to
the latest government figures, there are more than 1.2 million government employees and contractors with top-secret clearance.)
In November 2006, according to the documents, the Director of
National Intelligence approved the proposal. ICREACH was rolled out as a
test program by late 2007. It’s not clear when it became fully
operational, but
a September 2010 NSA memo
referred to it as the primary tool for sharing data in the intelligence
community. “ICREACH has been identified by the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence as the U.S. Intelligence Community’s standard
architecture for sharing communications metadata,” the memo states,
adding that it provides “telephony metadata events” from the NSA and its
Five Eyes partners “to over 1000 analysts across 23 U.S. Intelligence
Community agencies.” It does not name all of the 23 agencies, however.
The limitations placed on analysts authorized to sift through the
vast data troves are not outlined in the Snowden files, with only scant
references to oversight mechanisms. According to the documents, searches
performed by analysts are subject to auditing by the agencies for which
they work. The documents also say the NSA would conduct random audits
of the system to check for any government agents abusing their access to
the data.
The Intercept asked the NSA and the ODNI whether any
analysts had been found to have conducted improper searches, but the
agencies declined to comment.
While the NSA initially estimated making upwards of 850 billion
records available on ICREACH, the documents indicate that target could
have been surpassed, and that the number of personnel accessing the
system may have increased since the 2010 reference to more than 1,000
analysts. The intelligence community’s top-secret “Black Budget” for
2013, also obtained by Snowden,
shows
that the NSA recently sought new funding to upgrade ICREACH to “provide
IC analysts with access to a wider set of shareable data.”
In December last year, a surveillance review group appointed by President Obama
recommended
that as a general rule “the government should not be permitted to
collect and store all mass, undigested, non-public personal information
about individuals to enable future queries and data-mining for foreign
intelligence purposes.” It also recommended that any information about
United States persons should be “purged upon detection unless it either
has foreign intelligence value or is necessary to prevent serious harm
to others.”
Peter Swire, one of the five members of the review panel, told
The Intercept
he could not comment on whether the group was briefed on specific
programs such as ICREACH, but noted that the review group raised
concerns that “the need to share had gone too far among multiple
agencies.”